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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Decoding Phishing Evasion: Analyzing Attacker Strategies to Circumvent Detection Systems

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ABSTRACT Phishing remains a critical security threat, involving the creation of fraudulent websites to capture sensitive information. Despite existing detection systems, sophisticated attackers have developed advanced evasion techniques that undermine these defenses. This paper highlights the significant challenge of these novel methods, focusing on how attackers manage to prolong the operational lifespan of phishing sites. Our research investigates how attackers circumvent traditional security layers by employing a combination of target filtering mechanisms, bot detection evasion, blacklisting avoidance, and honeypots. Our experimental findings indicate that these evasion strategies can achieve an effectiveness rate of 80% to 85% in extending the viability of phishing sites. We have empirically demonstrated the exposure of current systems to these attacks, revealing specific vulnerabilities and exploitation points. These results underscore the urgent need for enhanced detection frameworks that address the layered and adaptive nature of modern phishing tactics. Our work highlights a critical gap in current security measures and poses a challenge to solution providers: there is a pressing need for novel mitigations to safeguard users against these sophisticated phishing threats.

INDEX TERMS Anti-phishing strategies, bot detection, captcha, cybersecurity, evasion techniques, honeypot, phishing detection.

I. INTRODUCTION

Phishing continues to be a dominant threat in the cybersecurity domain, characterized by the creation of fraudulent websites that closely resemble legitimate ones. The primary objective of these deceptive sites is to trick unsuspecting users into exposing sensitive information, such as passwords, credit card numbers, and other personal data. This illegitimate activity poses severe risks not only to individual users but also to organizations, leading to significant financial losses and damage to reputations. The persistent success of phishing campaigns, despite the widespread use of advanced detection

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systems, raises critical questions about the robustness of current cybersecurity measures and the strategies employed by attackers to evade them. Fig. 1 presents a graph illustrating the number of unique phishing sites detected globally from the third quarter of 2013 through the first quarter of 2024. The data demonstrates a consistent upward trend in the prevalence of phishing sites over this period.

Over the years, phishing techniques have evolved considerably, becoming increasingly sophisticated in their ability to bypass traditional detection mechanisms. Early studies, such as those by AlEroud and Karabatis [2], highlighted the basic evasion tactics used by phishing sites, including simple URL obfuscation and the use of misleading domain names. However, as detection technologies advanced, so too




FIGURE 1. Number of global phishing sites Q3 2013- Q1 2024 [1].

did the complexity of phishing methods. More recent research has documented the integration of advanced techniques such as bot detection, target filtering, and the use of CAPTCHA systems to thwart automated detection tools [3], [4]. These techniques enable attackers to prolong the lifespan of phishing sites, making them more resilient to being flagged or taken down by security systems.

Despite the growing corpse of literature on phishing detection, a significant gap remains in the comprehensive understanding of how these evasion techniques can be systematically combined to maximize their effectiveness. Lee et al. [5] and Rao and Pais [6] have discussed individual strategies such as the use of dynamic content and geographic filtering, yet few studies have explored the synergistic effects of combining multiple evasion tactics. This gap is particularly concerning given the increasing sophistication of phishing campaigns, which often employ a multi-layered approach to evade detection. Addressing this gap is crucial for developing more effective countermeasures that can keep pace with the evolving threat landscape.

In response to this gap, this study systematically investigates the integration of several advanced evasion techniques, including target filtering mechanisms, bot detection strategies, blacklisting avoidance, and the deployment of honeypots. By rigorously evaluating each technique's effectiveness through a series of controlled experiments, this research aims to develop a novel cumulative approach that significantly enhances the stealth of phishing sites. The methodology employed in this study includes both direct access filtering and CAPTCHA implementation, which are visually represented in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. These figures illustrate the layered defense mechanisms used to protect phishing sites from detection by public crawlers and other automated systems.

The importance of this research lies in its potential to inform the development of next-generation detection frameworks that are capable of countering these sophisticated




FIGURE 2. Bot filtering methodology to bypass anti-phishing systems.

evasion strategies. Current detection methods, which often rely on static and reactive measures, are increasingly inadequate in the face of dynamic and adaptive phishing techniques. By extending the operational lifespan of phishing sites, these evasion tactics not only increase the success rate of phishing campaigns but also complicate the efforts of cybersecurity professionals to track and mitigate these threats. Consequently, the findings of this study have significant implications for both the academic community and the cybersecurity industry, particularly in the areas of threat intelligence and incident response.

Moreover, the study's comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of combined evasion techniques provides valuable insights into the operational strategies of cyber attackers. This knowledge is critical for developing more proactive defense mechanisms that can anticipate and neutralize threats before they become widespread. The cumulative approach proposed in this research, which integrates direct access filtering, CAPTCHA implementation, and honeypots, is detailed in Table 1, where the efficiency rates of each technique are compared. The results demonstrate a significant increase in the resilience of phishing sites, with efficiency rates ranging between 80% and 85% as shown in (1) and (2). These findings



FIGURE 3. Various CAPTCHAs deployed in phishing sites to avoid anti-phishing systems.

are corroborated by similar studies, such as those conducted by Smith and Jones [7], which emphasize the need for more dynamic and adaptable detection systems.

TABLE 1. Efficiency rate of each technique.

| Symbol | Efficiency Rates | Details |
|--------|------------------|---|
| HF | 94% | the effectiveness of the honeypot technique |
| RF | 89% | the effectiveness of the region filter technique |
| | | magnetic induction |
| CF | 91% | the effectiveness of the CAPTCHA technique |
| USF | 76% | the effectiveness of the user screen filter tech- |
| | | nique |
| UAF | 84% | the effectiveness of the user-agent filter tech- |
| | | nique |
| DA | 63% | the effectiveness of the direct access technique |
| P | 82.83% | the probability of a website being live for the |
| | | campaign's end |

$$P = \frac{\sum(\text{RF, HF, CF, USF, UAF, DA})}{N}$$
(1)

$$P = 82.83\%$$
 (2)

In conclusion, this research provides a critical examination of the methods used by attackers to sustain their malicious activities over extended periods. By offering a detailed analysis of advanced evasion techniques and their combined effects, this study contributes to the ongoing discourse on cybersecurity and underscores the urgent need for enhanced detection strategies. The insights gained from this research not only highlight the vulnerabilities of current systems but also suggest practical steps that can be taken to improve the detection and mitigation of phishing attacks. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, it is imperative that the cybersecurity community remains vigilant and adaptive, continually refining its tools and techniques to stay ahead of increasingly sophisticated adversaries.

A. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION

The insights gained from this research not only highlight the vulnerabilities of current systems but also suggest practical

steps to improve phishing detection. This study makes the following contributions:

- Identification of Advanced Evasion Techniques: A systematic analysis of attacker strategies (e.g., bot detection evasion, CAPTCHA abuse) to bypass modern anti-phishing systems.
- **BYPHISH Framework:** Development of a multilayered evasion framework integrating honeypots, CAPTCHA, and adaptive filtering, achieving an 82.83% success rate.
- Empirical Validation: Controlled experiments over 10 days demonstrate how combined techniques prolong phishing site lifespan, even under free hosting constraints.
- **Operational Insights:** Analysis of usability trade-offs (e.g., CAPTCHA friction) and scalability challenges for real-world deployment.

These contributions address critical gaps in phishing research and provide a roadmap for next-generation detection systems. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews related work; Section III details the BYPHISH framework; Section IV presents experimental results; Section V concludes with future directions.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. EXPLOITATION OF ONLINE ADVERTISING IN PHISHING ATTACKS

The modern Internet economy thrives on online advertising, a key revenue source for platforms such as Google and YouTube. However, these advertising channels have also become tools for cybercriminals, particularly phishers, to deploy their deceptive tactics. Phishers exploit these platforms by creating advertisements that appear legitimate but are designed to redirect users to phishing sites or distribute malware once approved by security systems [12].

For instance, attackers often create ads related to popular topics like cryptocurrency. These ads, when clicked, lead users to phishing websites that mimic legitimate sites to harvest sensitive information, such as login credentials.

TABLE 2. Overview of techniques and limitations in phishing detection and evasion research.

| | Problem | Technique | Limitation | | |
|----------------|--------------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| [25] | Bypassing anti- | A black-box approach | Advanced script | | |
| | phishing systems | that analyzes HTML | injections, | | |
| | through scripting | automatically and | particularly those | | |
| | attacks on | blocks script execution | using obfuscation | | |
| vulnerable web | | using a reverse proxy | techniques, can evade | | |
| | applications. | server tool. | this detection method, | | |
| | | | compromising the | | |
| 1211 | E | WCAD | system. | | |
| [31] | Evasion of | WSAD approach | Scripts with pre- execution anomalies | | |
| | detection | uses a ten-feature | execution anomalies may bypass the | | |
| | mechanisms | model with regular | | | |
| | through | expressions to detect | detection, leading | | |
| | transcoding | malicious requests, | to potential security breaches. | | |
| | and advanced | clustering anomalies based on detected | breaches. | | |
| | scripting on online platforms. | features. | | | |
| [33] | Use of bots | | Pote that adapt and | | |
| [33] | | 0 | Bots that adapt and mimic human behav- | | |
| | in phishing | based bot detection | ior can evade detec- | | |
| | campaigns | using a neural | | | |
| | to spread | network trained | tion, making it diffi- | | |
| | misinformation | with supervised | cult to maintain accu- | | |
| | and bypass | and hierarchical | racy over time. | | |
| | anti-phishing | algorithms. | | | |
| | measures on | | | | |
| [24] | social media. | Duo oo duuusiiiC | Adaptiva hata d | | |
| [34] | Coordinated | Procedural analysis of | Adaptive bots that | | |
| | botnet attacks | web traffic on the host | alter their behavior in | | |
| | spreading | side to identify bot- | response to detection | | |
| | phishing content | nets using techniques | mechanisms can still | | |
| | and false | such as: Honey net de- | operate undetected, | | |
| | information, | tection, Host-based de- | causing significant | | |
| | evading | tection, Protocol vio- | harm. | | |
| | traditional | lation detection, and | | | |
| | detection | Signature-based detec- | | | |
| 64.63 | systems. | tion. | | | |
| [36] | Phishing attacks | WAVE provides a | Encryption and | | |
| | using XSS, | proactive security | obfuscation techniques | | |
| | CSRF, and | solution by filtering | used by attackers | | |
| | other scripting | web traffic and | remain challenging | | |
| | methods to | dynamically detecting | to detect, posing a | | |
| | infiltrate web | malicious scripts. | continued threat to | | |
| | systems and | | security. | | |
| | avoid detection. | | | | |
| [41] | Generating fake | Automated traffic cap- | Complex obfuscated | | |
| | traffic through | ture and mining al- | scripts and advanced | | |
| | web crawlers to | gorithms are applied | attacks are difficult | | |
| | overwhelm | to filter out crawler- | to distinguish from | | |
| | detection | generated traffic from | legitimate traffic, | | |
| | systems and | legitimate user traffic. | leading to potential | | |
| | support phishing | | system overloads. | | |
| F 4 6 1 | operations. | D | | | |
| [42] | Tracking and | Peer-to-peer tracking | Bots that closely | | |
| | filtering out | using CART combined | replicate human | | |
| | advanced bots | with virtual IP | behavior are | | |
| | and crawlers | | | | |
| | used in phishing | and filter out bots and | differentiate, | | |
| | schemes that | crawlers. | increasing the risk | | |
| | mimic legitimate | | of successful phishing | | |
| | users. | | campaigns. | | |
| [43] | Botnet attacks | Behavioral-based | Despite robust | | |
| | designed to | detection combined | security measures, | | |
| | disrupt server | with pattern-based | sophisticated attackers | | |
| | availability and | detection and SVM | can still breach | | |
| | evade detection, | models to identify | defenses, particularly | | |
| | causing business | and block malicious | through insider threats | | |
| | losses and | traffic. | or advanced persistent | | |
| | facilitating | | threats. | | |
| | phishing. | | | | |
| [44] | Exploiting | Dynamic analysis and | Advanced evasion | | |
| | legitimate web | regular expression fil- | techniques that | | |
| | forms to execute | tering to block spe- | avoid keyword | | |
| | phishing queries | cific keywords and de- | detection pose a | | |
| | | tect malicious traffic. | | | |
| | and extract | teet manerous traffic. | risk of undetected | | |
| | and extract sensitive data | teet manerous traine. | phishing activities. | | |

Once credentials are stolen, attackers can access accounts or transfer cryptocurrency to their wallets. Despite the

TABLE 3. Adversary solutions and limitations in phishing evasion research.

| Problem | Technique | Limitation | | |
|------------------|--|---|--|--|
| | A | | | |
| | | | | |
| , | 0 1 | | | |
| | | | | |
| web crawlers | Syntactic log analysis, | evade these detection | | |
| triggering | Analytical learning | methods, posing a | | |
| phishing web | analysis, Traffic | significant challenge. | | |
| pages by | pattern analysis, and | | | |
| indexing or | Turing test systems. | | | |
| surfing content. | | | | |
| Hosting web | Detection of web | Security scanners | | |
| scanners | scanning methods | | | |
| blocking | 0 | evolving with advanced research and techniques, which | | |
| U | 0 | | | |
| | | | | |
| U U | | | | |
| | 0 | v v 1 | | |
| U | 1 | | | |
| | | content despite the | | |
| phishing sites. | | blacklisting efforts. | | |
| | by categorically, | | | |
| | numerically, and | | | |
| | Boolean feature | | | |
| | methods. | | | |
| | bots, web scanners, and web crawlers triggering phishing web pages by indexing or surfing content. Hosting web scanners blocking phishing content | Search engine A semantic approach bots, web scanners, and using four parameters to detect bots: Syntactic log analysis, Analytical learning analysis, Traffic pages by indexing or surfing content. Hosting web scanners blocking phishing content. Hosting content. Hosting web scanners blocking phishing content when it goes online, thereby ireducing the lifespan of phishing sites. | | |

implementation of phishing detection tools like VirusTotal, URLVoid, and TrendMicro, attackers manage to circumvent these systems. Among these, URLVoid has demonstrated a relatively higher detection accuracy of 73%, attributed to its integration with multiple URL scanning engines [13]. This exploitation underscores the necessity for more advanced and adaptive security measures capable of identifying and mitigating these deceptive tactics. Fig. 4 illustrates some commonly used phishing detection techniques in cybersecurity.




FIGURE 4. Phishing detection techniques.

B. EVOLUTION OF PHISHING TECHNIQUES AND OFFENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES

Phishing techniques have evolved significantly, becoming increasingly sophisticated and difficult to detect. Traditional security measures, while foundational, have proven inadequate against the adaptive nature of phishing attacks. Attackers continually refine their strategies, utilizing advanced evasion techniques such as bot detection, CAPTCHA implementations, and target filtering, which have made phishing sites more resilient against detection and takedown efforts. Offensive security approaches have gained prominence as an effective countermeasure to these evolving threats. Techniques such as web application forensics and the deployment of honeypots are crucial in understanding and countering phishing strategies. Honeypots, specifically designed to attract and monitor attackers, gather valuable data that can be analyzed to enhance detection systems. This proactive approach enables cybersecurity professionals to anticipate and neutralize threats before they escalate [14].

Moreover, the rise of bots in the online environment adds complexity to phishing detection. Bots, often used to automate and scale phishing attacks, can generate fake traffic and overwhelm security systems. Advanced machine learning models are being developed to distinguish between human users and bots by analyzing behavioral patterns such as keystrokes, mouse movements, and interaction sequences. Studies, such as those conducted on the Sina-Weibo platform, have demonstrated high accuracy in identifying bot activities, highlighting the critical role of machine learning in enhancing anti-phishing measures [15].

C. ADVANCED EVASION TECHNIQUES AND PHISHING COUNTERMEASURES

The persistence of phishing attacks, despite the deployment of advanced detection systems, indicates the effectiveness of evasion techniques employed by attackers. Drive-by download attacks, where users unknowingly download malware by clicking on deceptive links, represent one of the most insidious threats in the phishing landscape. Tools like Ziffersystem have been developed to monitor network traffic for suspicious patterns and automatically respond to potential threats in real-time. The ability of such systems to operate effectively with minimal data input underscores their value in the cybersecurity arsenal [16].

Another critical challenge is detecting and mitigating bot-driven phishing attacks. Machine learning models, particularly those based on decision tree classifiers, have shown promise in improving the accuracy of bot detection. These models analyze web session data to identify anomalies indicative of bot activity, achieving accuracy rates as high as 83% [17]. The application of these models in real-world scenarios has proven effective in reducing the impact of bot-driven phishing attacks.

As attackers continue to refine their evasion strategies, defenders must adopt more sophisticated countermeasures. For instance, cloud-based bots represent a new frontier in phishing attacks, requiring advanced detection techniques that combine real-time monitoring with deep behavioral analysis. Studies have shown that multi-layered detection approaches can achieve accuracy rates exceeding 93% in identifying cloud bot activities, demonstrating the effective-ness of these methods in real-world applications [18].

In response to the evolving threat landscape, unsupervised learning techniques are being explored for phishing and bot detection. Algorithms like DBSCAN and OPTICS are used to analyze HTTP requests, clustering them based on patterns that distinguish between legitimate users and bots [19]. These techniques have been particularly effective in scenarios where bots mimic human interactions, providing a robust solution to a complex problem.

Additionally, reCAPTCHA remains a critical tool in the defense against automated bots. By challenging users with tasks that are simple for humans but difficult for bots, reCAPTCHA prevents unauthorized access to sensitive information. Advanced machine learning techniques such as XGBoost and LightGBM have been employed to enhance reCAPTCHA's accuracy in detecting bots, achieving success rates of up to 97% [20]. Fig. 3 illustrates various CAPTCHA methods deployed on phishing sites to bypass detection systems [45].

D. PHISHING DETECTION THROUGH URL ANALYSIS AND NETWORK TRAFFIC MONITORING

Phishing detection has increasingly focused on analyzing URLs, as attackers continuously adapt their strategies to bypass traditional security measures. Deep learning models have been developed to scrutinize URLs for signs of phishing, but adversaries have countered these efforts by employing adversarial examples—slight modifications to URLs designed to evade detection. Research indicates that such adversarial techniques can significantly disrupt classification models, leading to a 60% to 70% success rate in evading detection, underscoring the need for more resilient antiphishing systems [21].

Network traffic analysis has also emerged as a crucial aspect of phishing detection, particularly as attackers leverage AI-based malware that adapts to different environments. These next-generation threats use techniques such as encryption and polymorphism to avoid detection by traditional methods. In response, statistical HTTP filter-based techniques have been developed to analyze network traffic for patterns indicative of malicious activity. These methods have demonstrated success rates of up to 98.7% in filtering out malicious traffic, proving their effectiveness in the cybersecurity landscape [22].

Web crawlers, tools traditionally used for indexing and data gathering, have also been weaponized by attackers to create fake traffic and disrupt legitimate services. Detecting this malicious traffic requires advanced intrusion detection systems like Snort, which analyze network data for signs of attack. By employing pre-processing techniques that train detection models on potential threats, these systems can effectively prevent disruptions caused by malicious web crawlers [23].

To further secure web applications against threats like script injection attacks, clustering techniques used in black-box testing have proven effective in identifying vulnerabilities. These methods scan for potential injection points and generate comprehensive reports that help administrators fortify their applications against future exploits [24]. Fig.5 demonstrates the application of machine learning in phishing detection, showcasing the efficacy of these approaches in protecting web applications from sophisticated threats [45].

E. SECURING WEB APPLICATIONS FROM ADVANCED PHISHING TECHNIQUES AND BOTNET ATTACKS

Securing web applications against advanced phishing techniques and botnet attacks is a critical aspect of modern cybersecurity. Script injection attacks, including SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS), remain among the most dangerous threats, as they exploit vulnerabilities in web applications to inject malicious code. To combat these threats, black-box testing approaches are used to analyze input data and block malicious scripts before they reach the server [25]. These techniques are further enhanced by dynamic analysis tools that monitor network traffic in realtime, detecting and neutralizing scripts that pose a threat to the network environment. The proliferation of bots on




FIGURE 5. Illustration of a machine learning approach for detecting phishing URLs.

social media platforms has also exacerbated the problem of phishing, as bots are often used to spread misinformation and manipulate public opinion. Machine learning algorithms, including neural networks and hierarchical clustering, are employed to detect and filter out bot-generated content. These methods are crucial in maintaining the integrity of digital environments, particularly on platforms where user-generated content is prevalent [27].

Botnets, networks of compromised devices used to launch large-scale phishing attacks, pose a significant threat to cybersecurity. To counter these threats, honeypot-based techniques are used to lure bots into decoy systems, where their behavior can be studied and neutralized. These techniques, when combined with signature-based detection methods, improve the accuracy of botnet detection [28]. Intrusion detection systems and other network security tools are also employed to monitor traffic for signs of botnet activity, providing a comprehensive defense against these threats.

In offline environments, detecting bots requires a different approach. Techniques such as HTTP periodic prediction systems and neural networks are used to analyze user behavior over time, distinguishing between legitimate users and bots [29]. These systems rely on a range of parameters, including categorical, numerical, and Boolean features, to classify and filter out bot traffic, ensuring the security of online platforms. Fig. 5 illustrates a machine learning approach for detecting and categorizing phishing URLs to promptly identify and avoid phishing attacks.

Web scanning procedures play a vital role in safeguarding user data stored in web application databases. Tools like WAVE offer proactive solutions by analyzing web traffic in real-time, identifying vulnerabilities, and preventing attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and cross-site request forgery (CSRF) [30]. These tools, combined with deep neural network-based analysis, provide powerful means of securing web applications against a wide range of threats [31]. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the key findings from past research, categorizing them based on the overview of techniques and limitations in phishing detection and evasion research, as well as adversary solutions.

III. PROPOSED SYSTEM: BYPHISH-A PHISHING EVASION FRAMEWORK

In response to the increasing sophistication of phishing detection mechanisms, this research introduces BYPHISH, a comprehensive tool developed in PHP and JavaScript, designed to enhance the resilience of phishing websites by employing advanced evasion strategies. BYPHISH integrates multiple layers of filtering techniques, honeypots, and CAPTCHA systems to systematically bypass modern detection systems, thereby extending the operational lifespan of phishing sites. This section delineates the architecture, functionality, and efficacy of BYPHISH, which is meticulously aligned with the research objectives.

A. SYSTEM DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE

The architecture of BYPHISH is modular, comprising several interlinked components that work in concert to detect, assess, and neutralize threats posed by scanners and bots. The system's core functionality is built around the ability to dynamically adapt to incoming requests, discerning between legitimate users and detection systems. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the passive filtering module serves as the foundation for BYPHISH's defensive capabilities, where it begins by collecting vital data through decoy campaigns, which are crucial for subsequent active filtering operations.

1) PASSIVE FILTERING MECHANISM

Passive filtering acts as an initial line of defense by gathering information on potential threats through the deployment of decoy campaigns. These campaigns are designed to interact with online scanners, both free and paid, capturing




FIGURE 6. Passive filtering process in BYPHISH, capturing scanner/bot identifiers to build a blacklist and block threats before they reach phishing content.




FIGURE 7. Active filtering process in BYPHISH, capturing scanner/bot identifiers to build a blacklist and block threats before they reach phishing content.

IP addresses and other identifiers that are instrumental in constructing a robust blacklist. The gathered data is then used to inform and refine the active filtering processes, ensuring that BYPHISH is equipped to preemptively block known threats before they can interact with the actual phishing content. Fig. 6 illustrates the process of passive filtering, highlighting its role in the overall system architecture.

2) ACTIVE FILTERING TECHNIQUES

Active filtering builds upon the data collected during the passive phase, implementing real-time detection strategies that assess each incoming request based on a set of predefined parameters. This module is critical in ensuring that only legitimate traffic is granted access to the phishing content. A key component of active filtering is the direct access technique, which leverages both historical data and honeypots to identify and block suspicious requests. The technique functions by monitoring the source of each request, particularly focusing on whether the request is directly accessing the content or being redirected from a legitimate domain. Requests that do not conform to the expected patterns are immediately blacklisted, as depicted in Fig. 7.

3) USER-AGENT FILTERING

To further enhance its detection capabilities, BYPHISH employs user-agent filtering, which scrutinizes the user-agent strings of incoming requests to identify known bots and crawlers. Common user-agent identifiers such as "Googlebot," "Bingbot," and "Slurp" are flagged, and any request containing these identifiers is blocked from accessing the




FIGURE 8. User-agent filtering in BYPHISH blocks bots by detecting known identifiers in user-agent strings, redirecting and blacklisting them to prevent phishing access.




FIGURE 9. User screen filtering in BYPHISH flags and redirects non-standard configurations, adding a layer of protection against bots.

phishing site. The system is configured to detect a wide range of bot identifiers, effectively neutralizing automated detection attempts. The user-agent filtering process is detailed in Fig. 8, which demonstrates the system's capability to differentiate between human and bot traffic based on useragent analysis.

4) USER SCREEN FILTERING

Given the increasing sophistication of bot detection evasion, BYPHISH includes a user screen filtering module that analyzes the display characteristics of visitors. This module compares the screen resolution, color depth, and other parameters against known user profiles. Requests that originate from non-standard screen configurations—common among headless browsers used by bots—are flagged and redirected away from the phishing content. This technique serves as an additional layer of protection, ensuring that automated systems are unable to bypass BYPHISH's defenses. Fig. 9 provides a visual representation of the user screen filtering model.

5) CAPTCHA INTEGRATION

CAPTCHA systems are widely recognized for their effectiveness in distinguishing between human users and bots.





FIGURE 10. CAPTCHA based filtering in BYPHISH restricts bots and crawlers.



In BYPHISH, CAPTCHA is implemented as a two-step verification process, where the first interaction involves solving a CAPTCHA challenge, followed by access to the phishing content only if the challenge is successfully completed. This method not only deters bots from interacting with the phishing site but also adds a layer of security that is difficult for automated systems to circumvent. Fig. 10 depicts the CAPTCHA filtering model, illustrating how it is integrated into the overall architecture to enhance security.

6) REGION-BASED FILTERING

Region-based filtering is employed to restrict access to the phishing content based on the geographic location of the request. This approach is particularly effective in targeted phishing campaigns where the attackers seek to engage users from specific regions or organizations. BYPHISH utilizes IP geolocation data to enforce these restrictions, ensuring that only users from the targeted area can access the phishing content, while requests from non-targeted regions are redirected to benign pages. The region filtering model is shown in Fig. 11, which outlines how geographic restrictions are applied within the system.




FIGURE 11. Region based filtering in BYPHISH.

7) HONEYPOT DEPLOYMENT

Honeypots are strategically deployed within the BYPHISH framework to detect and neutralize crawlers. These honeypots

are embedded within the site's HTML structure and are designed to appear as legitimate links. When a crawler accesses these links, it is redirected to a blacklisting script, effectively neutralizing the threat. This approach ensures that automated systems are blocked before they can analyze the actual phishing content, as illustrated in Fig. 12, which presents the honeypot filtering model.

B. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

FIGURE 12. Honeypot based filtering in BYPHISH.

The integration of these modules within BYPHISH creates a multi-layered defense system that is highly effective at evading detection. Each component is designed to address specific aspects of phishing detection, and together they form a comprehensive strategy that significantly prolongs the lifespan of phishing sites. The overall approach, as depicted in Fig. 13, combines passive and active filtering, useragent analysis, CAPTCHA, and honeypots to create a robust framework capable of withstanding advanced detection techniques.

The system's effectiveness was evaluated across multiple phishing campaigns, with results indicating a marked increase in the resilience of phishing sites. Efficiency rates for each module were recorded, with honeypots achieving a 94% success rate in blocking crawlers, and the CAPTCHA system preventing 91% of bot-driven detection attempts. These results are consistent with industry forecasts, which predict a continued rise in automated cyber-attacks. BYPHISH's ability to adapt to evolving detection mechanisms makes it a valuable tool in the ongoing effort to protect sensitive information from phishing attacks.

C. SCALABILITY AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The scalability of the BYPHISH framework is a critical consideration, particularly in scenarios involving high traffic loads or the simultaneous operation of multiple phishing sites. The modular architecture of BYPHISH, which integrates passive and active filtering mechanisms, is designed to handle varying levels of traffic efficiently. However, under extremely high traffic conditions, the performance of certain components, such as CAPTCHA verification and honeypot




FIGURE 13. BYPHISH's multi-layered defense, integrating filtering, user-agent analysis, CAPTCHA, and honeypots to enhance phishing site resilience.

redirection, may require optimization. Future work will focus on stress-testing the framework under simulated high-traffic environments to evaluate its scalability and identify potential bottlenecks. Additionally, the use of distributed systems and cloud-based infrastructure will be explored to enhance the framework's ability to manage multiple phishing sites concurrently.

Another important consideration is the usability impact of CAPTCHA filtering. While CAPTCHA is highly effective in blocking automated bots, it introduces friction for legitimate users, potentially reducing the success rate of phishing campaigns. This trade-off between security and usability is inherent in CAPTCHA-based systems. To mitigate this issue, future iterations of BYPHISH will explore adaptive CAPTCHA mechanisms that dynamically adjust the complexity of challenges based on user behavior. For instance, users exhibiting human-like interaction patterns may be presented with simpler CAPTCHA challenges, reducing friction while maintaining security. Furthermore, alternative user verification methods, such as behavioral biometrics, will be investigated to minimize the impact on usability without compromising the framework's effectiveness.

D. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

As phishing techniques continue to evolve, further enhancements to BYPHISH are necessary to maintain its effectiveness. Future research will focus on integrating machine learning algorithms to enable real-time adaptation to new detection strategies, improving the system's ability to counter emerging threats. Additionally, expanding the database of known bots and crawlers will be critical to enhancing BYPHISH's detection capabilities. Continued development and testing of the system will ensure that it remains a cutting-edge solution in the ever-changing landscape of cybersecurity.

IV. RESULTS

The effectiveness of the proposed BYPHISH system was evaluated through a series of experiments conducted over a 10-day period. The primary goal was to assess the system's ability to prolong the lifespan of phishing websites by using various evasion techniques, including CAPTCHA, direct access filtering, and honeypots. These experiments were repeated four times under different conditions to ensure the reliability of the results. The websites were hosted on free web hosting services, specifically 000webhost, to simulate real-world scenarios where attackers may use similar platforms. Free web hosting services were used to simulate low-resource attack scenarios, which are common in certain types of phishing campaigns. These services are more easily detected by security systems, providing a challenging environment to test the effectiveness of the BYPHISH framework. Despite these challenges, the framework demonstrated significant success in prolonging the lifespan of phishing sites, highlighting its robustness and adaptability.

A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

The experiments were conducted across four distinct trials, with each trial lasting between 4 and 10 days. The duration of each trial was determined by the time it took for the phishing sites to be flagged or taken down by security systems. During each trial, we recorded the effectiveness of each evasion technique—CAPTCHA, direct access, honeypots, region filtering, user-agent filtering, and user screen filtering—against automated detection systems. Table 4 provides a comprehensive analysis of various filtering mechanisms designed to extend the lifespan of websites. The filters examined include Direct Access (DA), User Agent Filtering (UAF), User Screen Filtering (USF), CAPTCHA (CF), Old Data Filtering, Region Filtering (RF), and Honeypot




FIGURE 14. Effectiveness of Different Filtering Mechanisms in Extending the Lifespan of Phishing Websites. This figure illustrates the comparative effectiveness of various filtering mechanisms in prolonging the operational lifespan of phishing websites. The x-axis represents the number of requests from distinct IP addresses, categorized into four groups: 10+, 20+, 50+, and 100+ requests. These categories reflect increasing levels of traffic to the phishing sites, simulating real-world scenarios where detection systems may encounter varying volumes of requests. The y-axis represents the lifespan of the phishing websites in hours, indicating how long the sites remained active before being flagged or taken down by security systems.

Filtering (HF). Each filter contributes differently to the overall effectiveness of website longevity, with CAPTCHA and Honeypot filters demonstrating significantly greater impact as the volume of requests increases.

The "Days" column in the table represents the duration of the trial in days. The "No. Req." column indicates the number of requests from distinct IP addresses required to evaluate the website's lifespan for each filter. Finally, the table summarizes the lifespan of websites, measured in hours, for each filter based on specific durations and request counts. This allows for an assessment of the overall effectiveness of different filtering approaches in prolonging the lifespan of phishing websites.

TABLE 4. Analysis of website life filters.

| Days | No. Req. | Phishing Website Life (Hours) | | | | | | |
|------|----------|-------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|----------|----|-----|
| | | DA | UAF | USF | CF | Old Data | RF | HF |
| 4 | 10+ | 75 | 41 | 46 | 61 | 8 | 32 | 66 |
| 5 | 20+ | 98 | 47 | 39 | 74 | 17 | 41 | 109 |
| 8 | 50+ | 178 | 50 | 33 | 148 | 20 | 37 | 148 |
| 10 | 100+ | 240 | 62 | 48 | 185 | 20 | 49 | 208 |

The trials were structured as follows:

1) *Trial 1:* Duration of 4 days

2) Trial 2: Duration of 5 days

- 3) *Trial 3:* Duration of 8 days
- 4) Trial 4: Duration of 10 days

The key metrics for evaluation included the number of IP requests, the duration for which the phishing sites remained active, and the relative effectiveness of each technique. Data were collected after 10+, 20+, 50+, and 100+ IP requests to evaluate how the techniques performed as traffic to the sites increased. Fig. 14 demonstrates that CAPTCHA and Honeypot Filtering are the most effective approaches in extending the operational duration of phishing websites, as shown by their superior performance in prolonging website lifespan compared to other filtering mechanisms.

B. CUMULATIVE APPROACH AND SCORING METHODOLOGY

Given the varying effectiveness of individual techniques, a cumulative approach was adopted. This approach integrates all the techniques, with enhanced honeypots playing a central role, to confuse and bypass detection systems effectively. The cumulative approach was designed to maximize the probability (P) of a phishing site remaining active until the end of the campaign. To quantify the effectiveness of the combined techniques, we used the following equation:

$$P = \frac{\sum(\text{RF, HF, CF, USF, UAF, DA})}{6}$$
(3)

where:

- P = Probability of a website being live for the campaign's end
- RF = Effectiveness of the region filter technique
- CF = Effectiveness of the CAPTCHA technique
- USF = Effectiveness of the user screen filter technique
- UAF = Effectiveness of the user-agent filter technique
- DA = Effectiveness of the direct access technique
- N = Number of techniques used (in this case, 6)

Equation (3) is used to calculate the overall performance score after combining the techniques.

C. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Before the application of any filtering techniques, the performance score P would be zero as visible from (4) and (5), as no mechanisms are in place to prevent detection:

$$P = \frac{\sum(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)}{(4)}$$

$$P = 0 \tag{5}$$

However, after implementing the BYPHISH system with all techniques active, we observed a significant improvement in the websites' longevity. The performance scores were calculated based on the data collected during the experiments. The following scores were observed:

- Honeypot Technique (HF): 94%
- Region Filter Technique (RF): 89%
- CAPTCHA Technique (CF): 91%
- User Screen Filter (USF): 76%
- User-Agent Filter (UAF): 84%
- Direct Access (DA): 63%

The overall performance score was calculated using (6) and (7) as follows:

$$P = \frac{\sum(94, 89, 91, 76, 84, 63)}{6} \tag{6}$$

$$P = 82.83\%$$
 (7)


However, when adjusted for weighting and considering the cumulative approach, the final performance score Pwas calculated to be approximately 82.83%, reflecting the system's overall effectiveness in extending the lifespan of phishing websites.


D. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS


The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the BYPHISH framework in evading modern phishing detection mechanisms. The integration of multiple evasion techniques, particularly CAPTCHA and honeypots, proved instrumental in prolonging the operational lifespan of phishing websites. CAPTCHA, while introducing a layer of friction for users, played a critical role in deterring automated bots and detection systems. This friction, though potentially reducing the number of successful phishing attempts, is a necessary trade-off to prevent automated systems from accessing and flagging the phishing content. The significant impact of CAPTCHA in keeping phishing sites active for extended periods highlights its importance in the overall success of the framework.

The honeypot technique also demonstrated remarkable effectiveness, achieving a 94% success rate in blocking crawlers and automated detection systems. By strategically embedding honeypots within the site's HTML structure, the framework was able to neutralize threats before they could analyze the actual phishing content. This proactive approach significantly delayed the detection and takedown of phishing sites, as evidenced by the experimental results.

As depicted in Fig. 15, the number of hours the phishing pages remained active before being flagged or taken down varied significantly depending on the filtering techniques employed. The cumulative approach, which integrates direct access filtering, CAPTCHA, honeypots, and other evasion strategies, provided the most robust defense. Phishing sites employing this approach remained active for the full duration of the experiments in several instances, achieving an overall performance score of 82.83%. This underscores the importance of combining multiple evasion techniques to maximize the resilience of phishing websites against modern detection systems.







While the experiments were conducted using free web hosting services (e.g., 000webhost) to simulate low-resource attack scenarios, the results remain highly relevant. Free hosting services are more easily detected by security systems, providing a challenging environment to test the framework's effectiveness. Despite these challenges, BYPHISH demonstrated significant success in keeping phishing sites active for extended periods, highlighting its robustness and adaptability. However, it is acknowledged that real-world phishing campaigns often employ more sophisticated hosting solutions. Future experiments will explore the system's performance in such environments, including cloud-based services, to evaluate its effectiveness under more realistic conditions.

The findings of this study underscore the need for continuous innovation in phishing detection methodologies to counter increasingly sophisticated evasion strategies. The BYPHISH framework represents a significant step forward in understanding and mitigating advanced phishing threats. Future research will focus on conducting longer-term experiments to evaluate the system's performance over extended periods, as well as integrating machine learning algorithms to enable real-time adaptation to emerging threats. These efforts will ensure that the framework remains effective in the face of evolving phishing tactics and detection mechanisms.

V. CONCLUSION

Phishing attacks remain one of the most pervasive and evolving threats in the cybersecurity landscape, with attackers continuously refining their techniques to bypass detection mechanisms. This study presents a comprehensive analysis of advanced evasion strategies, focusing on their individual and combined effectiveness in prolonging the operational lifespan of phishing websites. Through a series of controlled experiments, we identified direct access filtering, CAPTCHA integration, and honeypot deployment as the most effective techniques, which were systematically combined into a novel cumulative approach. This approach has demonstrated significant resilience against modern detection systems, achieving an overall performance score of P=82.83%.

The experimental results highlight the critical role of CAPTCHA and honeypots in evading automated detection systems. CAPTCHA, while introducing a layer of friction for users, proved highly effective in blocking bots and delaying the takedown of phishing sites. Similarly, honeypots successfully neutralized crawlers by redirecting them to blacklisting scripts, further enhancing the framework's ability to evade detection. The integration of these techniques, along with direct access filtering, user-agent filtering, and region-based filtering, created a multi-layered defense system that significantly extended the lifespan of phishing websites.

The significance of this research lies in its practical implications for both cybersecurity defenders and threat actors. For defenders, the findings underscore the urgent need for more dynamic and adaptive detection frameworks capable of countering sophisticated evasion strategies. For attackers, the study highlights the effectiveness of combining multiple evasion techniques to maximize the success of phishing campaigns. As evidenced by discussions in cybercriminal forums, even short-lived phishing campaigns can yield substantial results, emphasizing the importance of rapid and robust detection mechanisms to mitigate potential damage.

However, the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies presents new challenges for both attackers and defenders. Modern detection systems are increasingly leveraging AI-driven techniques, such as behavior analysis and similarity-based detection, to identify and neutralize phishing threats. The BYPHISH framework addresses these advancements by employing CAPTCHA and honeypots to trick sophisticated systems and block automated bots. Nevertheless, the ongoing arms race between attackers and defenders necessitates continuous innovation and adaptation.

Looking ahead, future research will focus on addressing emerging threats, such as browserless or headless crawling, which enable bots to simulate human behavior with greater accuracy. Additionally, the integration of machine learning algorithms into the BYPHISH framework will be explored to enable real-time adaptation to evolving detection mechanisms. Longitudinal studies will also be conducted to evaluate the system's performance over extended periods and across diverse attack scenarios, including more sophisticated hosting environments such as cloud-based services.

In conclusion, this study makes significant contributions to the field of cybersecurity by providing a detailed analysis of advanced phishing evasion techniques and their combined effectiveness. The proposed BYPHISH framework represents a robust and adaptable solution for prolonging the lifespan of phishing websites, offering valuable insights for both academic research and practical applications. However, as the threat landscape continues to evolve, the cybersecurity community must remain vigilant and proactive in developing innovative countermeasures to stay ahead of increasingly sophisticated adversaries. The findings of this research lay the groundwork for future advancements in phishing detection and mitigation, ensuring that cybersecurity defenses remain effective in the face of emerging challenges.

While BYPHISH achieved 82.83% evasion efficacy, future work will address:

- Longitudinal Studies: 6-month trials to assess adaptability to evolving detection tools.
- Cloud-Based Attacks: Testing on Azure/GCP to refine scalability metrics.
- **AI-Driven Evasion:** Integrating GPT-4 to generate dynamic CAPTCHA challenges.
- Victim Experience: Reducing abandonment rates via adaptive friction (e.g., simpler CAPTCHAs for human-like behavior).

These steps will enhance BYPHISH's practicality in real-world campaigns and inform defense strategies.

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